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France: Supreme Court Traffic Rules

THE OHIO SUPREME COURT'S
TRAFFIC COURT RULES:
A BEGINNING OF PROCEDURAL
RULE-MAKING
by Professor James G. France*
Introduction

W

one-page announcement on November 14,
1967, the Supreme Court of Ohio assumed not only the
power of control, but, in a sense, responsibility for, the operations
of one of the most variegated collections of minor courts in the
country.' The occasion was its adoption of uniform rules of prac2
tice in traffic matters for all courts inferior to the court of common pleas. In so doing it joined a limited group of some eight
4
states,3 led by New Jersey, which dared to enter a potential
quagmire dominated by local politicians, traffic safety zealots,
civil libertarians and assorted publicity seekers.
To Ohio and its Supreme Court the adventure had never
before appeared particularly inviting. Unlike many of the other
jurisdictions asserting this sort of control, the Ohio court had no
ITH A SIMPLE

* Professor of Law, University of Akron College of Law; formerly Judge,
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Seventh Appellate District.
1 The collection includes not only county courts and municipal courts but
police courts (though few now exist) and juvenile courts which administer
traffic justice to juvenile traffic offenders. § 2151.021 Ohio Rev. Code (1965).
In addition, city and village mayors in communities not the site of municipal
courts exercise judicial power over ordinance offenses and certain misdemeanors. § 1905.01 Ohio Rev. Code (1965).
2 The rules were first published 40 Ohio Bar 1434 (Dec. 4, 1967). All further
mention of the text of the rules is with reference to such publication. Only
the title of the rules and those provisions relating to the uniform traffic
ticket itself are specifically limited to traffic matters. By contrast, the Illinois
rules effective January 1, 1968, relate to "traffic cases, quasi criminal cases,
and certain misdemeanors." 230 N.E. 2d xxi.
3 New Jersey (January 1, 1949), Missouri, Arizona, Oregon, Washington,
Connecticut, and Illinois preceded Ohio in that order. Similar results have
been achieved elsewhere by statute. See Ind. Stat. Ann. § 47-2326 (1965).
4 The New Jersey rules were used as the principal basis of the Missouri
rules and those of all other states except Ohio, and to some extent, Illinois.
They were also extensively relied on by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in drafting Model Rules Governing Procedure in Traffic Cases (1957).
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background of experience in imposing administrative or procedural controls on its courts of general jurisdiction. 5 It had
only one dead-letter regulation which purported to regulate continuances for trial 6-a provision almost universally ignored by
Ohio's common pleas judges. In fact less than a week before
adopting the rules it had ratified the power of individual common
pleas courts to impose their own separate rules, creating severe
7
restrictions on the constitutional right to jury trial.
Not only the Court, but the whole framework of Ohio law
and practice seemed barren of assertion of court leadership in
balancing the competing demands of traffic safety, increased police activity, heavy trial dockets, and the rising tide of civil libertarianism. Ohio has been conspicuously a "loner" and part of a
small minority in many legal fields, particularly in court administration, procedure and jurisdiction.' It has clung tenaciously to
5 Creation of the rule-making power has been the subject of desultory
efforts by the Ohio State Bar Association, primarily in the last ten years,
as part of a modern courts proposal to amend Ohio's constitution. The current proposal, well watered-down before passage in the House of Representatives, awaits voters' action at the primary election in May, 1968, when
it will appear on the ballot as a proposed constitutional amendment. The sole
administrative control now exercised is that of assigning less occupied judges
from rural courts to sit in metropolitan counties or in courts where single
judges are disqualified, a power exercised by the Chief Justice and always
on a consensual basis.
6 Supreme Court Rule XXV (1957) 167 Ohio St. LXXVi, not readopted in
1964, 176 Ohio St. LXiV.
7 Cassiday v. Glossip, 12 Ohio St. 2d 17, 231 N.E. 2d 64 (1967).
8 In administration, the Court's statistical service is rudimentary. It gives
input, output, and pending case load figures, but makes no effort, as it once
did, to estimate the age of cases pending on the dockets of the trial courts,
nor does it attempt to suggest any measures for reform. Even compulsory
pre-trial as an aid to disposition is not particularly encouraged. See Bognar
v. Cleveland Quarries Co., 7 Ohio App. 2d 187, 219 N.E. 2d 827 (1966).
Of particular note are two comparatively recent Supreme Court decisions relating to service and joinder. In Huggins v. Morell, 176 Ohio St.
171, 198 N.E. 2d 448 (1964), it virtually emasculated a then recent liberal
joinder of causes of action provision (§ 2309.05 (1959)) by applying to it a
restrictive joinder of parties provision (§ 2309.06 (1953)). The legislature
promptly responded by repealing the latter statute. Still later, in Henderson v. Ryan, 13 Ohio St. 2d 31 (1967), the dissent argued that repeal
of the old party joinder section was unnecessary to achieve a liberal result.
In Hudzik v. Alcorn, 4 Ohio St. 2d 45, 212 N.E. 2d 419 (1965), a unanimous
court refused to apply any theory of estoppel to claim defective service on
a minor where the minor defendant's counsel, after pleading to a tort claim
and participating in pre-trial activities, withheld objections to the service
and disclosure of minority until after the statute of limitations had run.
The legislature promptly responded by authorizing service on a minor as if
an adult in such tort claims (§ 2703.131 Ohio Rev. Code (1965)) and for
good measure required prompt disclosure of minority status by a defendant
in all suits. (§ 2309.261). The Court has not since found occasion to pass on
whether such legislation was necessary.
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its Field Code of civil procedure while other states have turned
to procedural rule-making; it has fought court control of discovery at every turn; 9 it is one of an extremely limited minority
which still attaches the consequences of jurisdictional failure to a
simple invoking of the wrong venue.10 Even in the matter of the
presumption of order of death it is one of only four states to refuse to adopt a simple uniform act recommended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws." In view of the preceding, for
what reasons would the Ohio Supreme Court take such an unprecedented step?
The answer is believed to lie partly in the attitude of the
Court toward police administrative problems, partly in its desire
to make something of a case for a pending modern-courts constitutional amendment 12 which confers on it similar rule-making
powers over other courts; 13 and partly in the manner of the
presentation of the proposed rules to the Court.
As to the first of these reasons, the Ohio Supreme Court can
be characterized as extremely sensitive and responsive to the
police position on civil liberties. Many may have forgotten it, but
in the wake of the Boyd 14 and Weeks 15 decisions the Ohio Court
9 In re Martin, 141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388 (1943); In re Frye, 155 Ohio
St. 345, 98 N.E.2d 798 (1951); Ex parte Oliver, 173 Ohio St. 125, 180 N.E.2d
599 (1962). Mobberly v. Sears Roebuck, 4 Ohio App.2d 126, 211 N.E.2d 839
(1965).
The tide seems belatedly to be turning. See State ex rel. Staton v. Common Pleas Court, 5 Ohio St. 2d 17, 213 N.E. 2d 164 (1965); State ex rel. Jackman v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
State v. White, 9 Ohio App. 2d 271, 221 N.E.2d 722 (1966); State v. Hill, 12
12 Ohio St. 2d 88 (1967); Evans v. Grange Mut. Cas. Co., 12 Ohio Misc. 108
(1967).
10 The classic example is Bucurenciu v. Ramba, 117 Ohio St. 546, 159 N.E.
561 (1927); followed in Glass v. McCullough Transfer Co., 159 Ohio St. 505,
112 N.E.2d 823 (1953).
11 Report of Probate and Trust Law Committee, Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 40
Ohio Bar 1302 (1967).
12 See constitutional amendment, supra note 5.
13 In France, Judicial Reorganization-A Solution to Congestion?, 68 Dick.
L. Rev. 143, 151 (1964), the author indicated that lack of desire to promulgate traffic court rules indicated equal indisposition to face up to the challenge of rule-making for courts of general jurisdiction and predicted that
"[t]he Supreme Court of Ohio will scarcely be bursting with enthusiasm to
assert any effective degree of control over the practices of trial courts."
Even assuming the correctness of such a prophecy, it is suggested that the
Court could scarcely leave unused for a period of more than seven years
a legislatively-conferred rule making power over minor courts while the
organized bar of the state was contending strenuously that nothing but the
grant of rule-making power over all courts would prevent undue congestion.
14 116 U.S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 534 (1886).
15 232 U.S. 383, 34 S. Ct. 341 (1914).
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in the early 1930's had a brief honeymoon with the exclusionary
rule. 16 But in 1936 in an opinion written by one of the present
judges and dealing with terrorist bombings in Cleveland, it
abruptly abandoned the rule17 and relegated the victims of an
admittedly illegal and highhanded search to their civil remedies
against the searching officers. When the United States Supreme
Court in Wolf v. Colorado8 delivered what many other state
courts interpreted and followed as a broad hint to adopt the exclusionary rule of their own volition, 19 the Ohio court quoted it
as giving a guarantee that the U.S. Constitution did not require
state courts to impose the rule. 20 It was, as a matter of history,
reversed in the very case in which it had chosen to make the
22

statement, 2 1 and this was the first of the long parade of Mapp,
Beck, 28 McLeod 24 and O'Connor.25 In each successive case the

Ohio court, with increasing defensiveness, supported the police
position, using factual distinctions and procedural niceties, 26 and
16 Nicholas v. City of Cleveland, 125 Ohio St. 474, 182 N.E. 26 (1932);
Browning v. City of Cleveland, 126 Ohio St. 285, 185 N.E. 55 (1933).
17 State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio St. 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936).
18 338 U.S. 25, 69 S. Ct. 1359 (1949).
19 In recounting the history and effect of the Wolf pronouncement the
Court's opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961), points
out, in 367 U.S. at 651:
"While in 1949, prior to the Wolf case, almost two-thirds of the
States were opposed to the use of the exclusionary rule, now, despite
the Wolf case, more than half of those since passing upon it, by their
own legislature or judicial decision, have wholly or partly adopted or
adhered to the Weeks rule ....
The experience of California that such
other remedies have been worthless and futile is buttressed by the experience of other states. The obvious futility of relegating the Fourth
Amendment to the protection of other remedies has, moreover, been
recognized by this court since Wolf...."
20 State v. Mapp, 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960).
21

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).

22

67 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1961).

Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1963), reversing State v. Beck,
175 Ohio St. 73, 191 N.E.2d 825 (1963).
24 McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356, 85 S. Ct. 156 (1965), reversing State v.
McLeod, 1 Ohio St. 2d 60, 203 N.E.2d 349 (1964).
25 O'Connor v. Ohio, 385 U.S. 92, 87 S. Ct. 257 (1966), reversing State v.
O'Connor, 6 Ohio St. 2d 169, 217 N.E.2d 685 (1966).
26 In McLeod, remanded to the Ohio Supreme Court "for consideration in
the light of Massiah v. United States," the majority of the latter court elaborately distinguished the Massiah case, and others, on their facts. A dissent
by Gibson, J., 1 Ohio St. 2d at 63 pointed out that a prior case, Doughty v.
Sacks, Warden, 372 U.S. 781 (1962), had been previously remanded for fur(Continued on next page)
23
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with increasing curtness the U.S. Supreme Court undermined
the police position, brushing aside the procedural niceties.2 7 The
positions assumed by the two courts were as nearly polar as the
two courts could make them.
In the middle of this sensitive and police-supporting atmos25
phere, chronologically between the opinions in State v. Mapp
and Mapp v. Ohio, 29 the first committee appointed to draft uniform rules presented its report. The report drew objections primarily from police departments, including the Cleveland police.
Both in brief and in oral argument in support of a motion to
adopt the rules, the committee made some rather tart observations concerning the Cleveland police department and traffic
ticket fixing scandals in Cleveland.3 0 The answer of the court
was to deny the motion for adoption, reorganize the committee
by adding police chief representatives, and direct the reorganized
committee to restudy the matter. 31 This the committee did. It
resubmitted a report with minor modifications and some of the
police representatives still in dissent. The report was received
by the Court shortly after the decision in Mapp v. Ohio was announced. 32 For six months the Court maintained a complete
silence on the new report. The committee chairman then submitted his resignation and almost immediately the court declined to adopt the rules "at this time," giving as its reason "lack
of unanimity among police agencies." 33
(Continued from preceding page)
ther consideration in the light of Gideon v. Wainwright, that the Ohio court
had adhered to its previous position, and had been summarily reversed. It
predicted, correctly, that the majority would be summarily reversed in
McLeod. In O'Connor, remanded "for further proceedings in light of Griffin
v. California," the majority of the Ohio Court attempted procedural distinctions. The dissent by O'Neill, 6 Ohio St. 2d at 176 correctly predicted
from the Doughty and McLeod experiences another summary reversal.
27 In contrast to Mapp and Beck, the reversing opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in McLeod was exactly one sentence long and that in
O'Connor less than a page.
28 170 Ohio St. 427, 166 N.E.2d 387 (1960).
29 367 U.S. 643, 81 S. Ct. 1684 (1960).
30 Reply Memorandum of Committee at 3, 5, In the Matter of Uniform Rules
of Criminal Practice in Minor Courts, Ohio Supreme Court, unreported. An
even more serious scandal erupted in Cleveland in May, 1962, precipitated
by activities of a newspaper reporter. Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 29, 30,
31, June 5, 1962; editorial June 2, 1962.
31 Journal Entry, February 1961, supra, n. 30.
32 Mapp v. Ohio was announced June 19, 1961. The second committee report, which showed no police dissent, was forwarded to the court in July,
1961.
33 Journal Entry, February 14, 1962, supra, n. 30.
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During the following four years the committee merely
marked time. Then the State Highway patrol, formerly opposed
to the uniform traffic ticket, changed its attitude and adopted the
ticket for use in its own operations. 34 After extensive conferences, first the Toledo and Cleveland, then the Dayton, and
finally the Columbus and Cincinnati police departments, securing
slight modifications of the ticket, announced their willingness to
accept it. Police unanimity, the lack of which was the ostensible
basis of the Court's previous adverse decision, had been secured!
But it was not merely police dislike of the uniform ticket
which had to mellow; an apparent civil libertarian and antipolice bias was, at least to some, discernible both in the statutory
amendments which authorized the ticket and the rules, and in
the original composition of the committee charged with the drafting of the rules themselves. Not only were the statutory amendments themselves given publication in advance of passage, 35 with
observations and comments which could be construed to reflect
on police, but some rather advanced (for their day) provisions
on right to counsel and prompt arraignment or release of the
accused were introduced, 36 which seemed to run counter to the
police position on such matters. The chairman of the rulesdrafting committee had been the draftsman of both the original
civil libertarian amendments and the committee's brief in favor
of the rules. This brief at first submission dwelt, perhaps unkindly, on the Cleveland police department ticket fixing scan34 Use of the ticket on a state wide basis commenced January 1, 1967.

35 Draftsman's comments, as well as text of the proposed amendments, are
contained in Report of Criminal Law Committee, Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 31
Ohio Bar 417, May 12, 1958.
36 Principal changes introduced by the amendments (123 Ohio Laws 97)
were: requirement that a person arrested under warrant must be taken
forthwith before a magistrate, or if a magistrate is not available, admitted
to bail, § 2935.13 Ohio Rev. Code (1965); requirement that the jailor make
available to a prisoner facilities to communicate with an attorney or other
person able to provide him with counsel or bail, with criminal penalty provided against the jailor, § 2935.14; right of roving inquiry on part of magistrates with relation to uncharged prisoners "whenever it comes to the attention" instead of waiting for the filing of writ of habeas corpus, § 2935.16; requirement that the magistrate inform the accused at first appearance of right,
not only to counsel, but to continuance to secure counsel, and of not only the
nature of the charge, but the identity of his accuser, § 2937.02; provision that
delay in preliminary hearing for more than ten days in a felony case is
grounds for discharge forthwith, § 2937.21, and a similar provision for trial
of misdemeanors within thirty days, § 2938.03.

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol1/iss2/1

6

France: Supreme Court Traffic Rules

SUPREME COURT TRAFFIC RULES

dal.37 By the time of the second submission of the rules Mapp v.
Ohio38 had just been reported. Before the second report was con-

sidered the committee chairman, then a common pleas judge,
applied what appeared to be (to him) Mapp's logical implications
to set aside a lineup identification in a Cleveland police department case, 39 thus anticipating the Wade 40 rule by more than five
years. This was hardly the time to extend the Mapp rule in Ohio,
and it is scarcely surprising that that particular judge was never
again assigned to sit in Cleveland as a trial judge. His resignation as committee chairman took place shortly thereafter.
But by 1967, the novelty of the civil libertarians' position
had worn thin. Beck,41 McLeod 42 and O'Connor43 came and went.
Even in State v. Terry44 the Ohio Court failed to find a substan-

tial constitutional question, letting it go to the Supreme Court of
the United States as Terry v. Ohio.45 No more arguments between the committee and the police departments occurred in
open court, for the report in 1967, in contrast to the first two
presentations, was received in camera. Great care was taken in
the transmittal of the rules to suggest that their whole purpose
was not to control police action, but to give the police a firmer
hand and more power in controlling the activities of the traffic
violator, if not the courts in which both police and violator appeared. The rest is history.
The Ticket
The most controversial and hard fought of the new rules is
the Uniform Traffic Ticket, as provided for in Rule .14 and the
form supplement. It bears a high degree of surface resemblance
to the much-publicized American Bar Association Uniform Traffic
See n. 27 supra. The fact that the comments, Reply Memorandum at 4,
were made in reply to an ill-timed boast by Cleveland's Safety Director
that the Cleveland tickets had stood the test of time and enjoyed freedom
from complaint probably did not help.
38 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1960).
39 State v. Miller, unreported, #74750 Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Ct.
November, 1961.
40 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926 (1967).
41 379 U.S. 89, 85 S. Ct. 223 (1964).
42 381 U.S. 356, 85 S.Ct. 156 (1964).
43 385 U.S. 92, 87 S.Ct. 257 (1966).
44 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, 214 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
45 387 U.S. 929, 87 S. Ct. 2050, 18 L.Ed. 989 (May 29, 1967). The case has
already been argued on the merits. 36 U.S. Law Week 3245 (1968).
37
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Complaint, in official use in New Jersey, Missouri, Oregon, Washington, Illinois, Indiana, Connecticut, and parts of Florida, and
in unofficial use in Michigan and other states. Its four precarboned or pressure sensitized pages, sized 4/4 by 8
inches,
have basically the same distribution: one copy to the court to
serve as a charging document, one copy, endorsed by the court
after conviction, to serve as a report to the state licensing authority; one copy as a police record; and one to be given to the violator to serve in lieu of a court summons. The face of all pages
is essentially the same.
But a detailed examination of the ticket adopted by the Supreme Court reveals many points of departure from the American Bar Association model. The Ohio ticket does contain, like
the model, a series of ruled blocks, with legends beside them, for
indicating by check mark or "x" in each block a specific moving
traffic violation "plainly but tersely" described in accordance
with statute. Authority for this type of ticket affidavit was
thoughtfully provided by the legislature in 1959 at the same time
as it provided authority for the rules themselves. 46 Provision is
also made for description in the ticket of the conditions of road,
weather and traffic, also by the "check-the-proper-blocks" technique.
But it is at this point that all similarity to the American Bar
Association ticket complaint ends, both because of different statutory conditions and a different climate of opinion in Ohio. The
American Bar offering, based on the Uniform Vehicle Code, purports to put into block form some six common traffic offenses:
speeding, improper left turns, improper right turns, stop sign
and traffic light violations, and passing and lane usage violations.
Each of the six groups of offenses is arranged in three gradations
of seriousness, in ascending order from left to right. The blocks
outlining the conditions of weather, traffic, and road are similarly increased in seriousness of condition from left to right. The
whole system is designed so that a traffic judge can mentally determine the amount of the fine by looking at the position of the
47
various check marks on the ticket form itself.
Provision for the rules generally is contained in § 2937.46 Ohio Rev. Code
(1965). The ticket authority is spelled out more precisely in § 2935.17.
47 The standard American Bar Association ticket is published in Model
Rules governing Procedure in Traffic Cases, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1957. For explanation of automatic fine
determination from placement of check marks, see M. Halsey, Judge and
Prosecutor in Traffic Court 318 (1951).
46
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The Ohio ticket designers were confronted with the need for
radical departure from such a system. In the first place, Ohio's
maverick Uniform Traffic Code (uniform only for Ohio) has little
resemblance to the generally adopted Uniform Vehicle Code.
A "reasonable and proper" 48 speed law with prima facie limits
does not lend itself to charges that a driver is speeding 5-10,
11-15, or over 15 miles per hour "over limit" as inscribed in the
American Bar complaint. Similarly since Ohio law provides that
a person entering an intersection on a green (or yellow) traffic
light is not in violation of law 49 if the light changes after he has
entered, it makes no difference where within the intersection he
is when the light turns red. The American Bar complaint's description of "cutting corner" as one of the gradations of a turning
offense likewise did not seem consonant with Ohio's Uniform
Traffic Act. 50
Apart from such difficulties, the guide to purely mechanical
fine calculation implied in traffic ticket design was not particularly enticing to the Ohio committee. As a result they abandoned
the effort to limit use of the ticket to only six basic offenses in
gradations of seriousness and by judicious use of related offenses
in the three columns of blocks in the Ohio ticket form they managed to describe, in terse printing beside the blocks, some twentyfour more or less separate moving traffic violations, including
violation of Ohio's dubiously described reckless operation statute. 51 Similarly, any effort at arranging street and highway conditions in ascending order of seriousness was written off in the
§ 4511.21 Ohio Rev. Code (1965).
Springfield v. Stovall, 117 Ohio App. 203, 192 N.E.2d 72 (1962); Case v.
Carter, 103 Ohio App. 11, 142 N.E.2d 670 (1956).
50 In their wording § 4511.36 (B) Ohio Rev. Code and § 11-601(b) of the
Uniform Vehicle Code are identical, specifying that the vehicle shall be
right of center both entering and leaving the intersection on a left turn and
that "whenever practicable the left turn shall be made in that portion of
the intersection to the left of center of the intersection." The decision in
Gratziano v. Grady, 83 Ohio App. 265, 78 N.E.2d 767 (1948) throws doubt on
whether the term "cutting corner" would state an offense under Ohio law.
51 Ohio traffic judges have frequently described the language of § 4511.20
Ohio Rev. Code (1965) as being nothing more than a recitation of actionable
civil negligence with a built-in contributory negligence defense, since it
charges operating "without due regard to the safety and rights of . . . so as
to endanger the life, limb or property of any person while in lawful use of
the streets or highways."
In the 1967 legislature a degree of liberality in the definition was
achieved by deleting the requirement that the things and persons endangered must be "in the lawful use" of streets and highways, the provision
that invited the contributory negligence defense. 132 Ohio Laws § 179.
48
49
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Ohio ticket. For small town and rural courts, the various weather, road and traffic conditions may still be checked off. But option is given to the larger communities, where fixed fines are normally imposed in traffic violations bureaus,5 2 to eliminate these
conditions blocks altogether and to substitute a place for the traffic judge to note sentence on plea of guilty, or such other matter
as the local court finds desirable.
One difference, not immediately apparent, between the
American Bar ticket complaint and the Ohio adaptation lies in
the form of jurat used. In many of the American Bar complaint
jurisdictions, notably Michigan, an information and belief affidavit is sufficient to charge crime-or at least a traffic offenseand the jurat is so drawn. Ohio, on the other hand, has a strict
rule that the affidavit, to constitute a valid charge, must be sworn
to positively. 53 Use of the American Bar Association complaint
form by some Ohio courts in the past has resulted in reversal of
conviction. 54 Enforced use of the new Ohio prescribed ticket is
likely to pay a small dividend in eliminating the uncritical use
of defective jurats, designed for other jurisdictions.
The principal benefits of enforced use of a standard ticket
form will come from the uniform plain but terse phrases used to
describe the offenses themselves. Some of the descriptive phrases
used admittedly are not models of the best possible grammar,
and in the prescribed ticket there is an almost breathless change
from the use of the nouns "speed" and "improper turn" to past
participles, "failed," to present participles "following" and "endangering." But with the possible exception of the phrases "cut
in" and "cut out," used in the passing offenses and lane usage
category, all 24 offenses tersely described in Ohio's ticket appear
52 Both the time of institution and the number of offenses which are violations bureau-disposable varies from city to city, but all five of Ohio's largest
city courts now use a traffic violations bureau for moving violations. Columbus and Cincinnati have both the earliest and most widespread use, that in
Columbus not being confined to traffic matters but including some offenses
of a police court character. Akron did not institute such a violations bureau
for moving offenses under court control until 1967.
53 Informal opinion of Attorney General No. 50, January 6, 1958, unpublished, but issued to Director, Ohio Department of Highway Safety, citing
Pope v. Cincinnati, 3 Ohio Cir. Ct. 497, 2 Ohio Cir. Dec. 285 (1888); United
States v. Carter, 14 Weekly Law Bull. 191, 5 Ohio Fed. Dec. 592 (1887). See
also Miller v. State, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 488 (1924); State v. Gutilla, 59 Ohio L.
Abs. 289 (1950).
54 City of Willoughby v. Hugebeck, 2 Ohio App. 2d 36, 206 N.E.2d 234
(1964); City of South Euclid v. Clapacs, 6 Ohio Misc. 101, 213 N.E.2d 828
(1966).
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to be readily understandable to a driver. They appear to be a
distinct improvement on police-jargon coded descriptions now
frequently used by traffic officers in hand written citations. "Fail
con," "grasshop," "zig-zag," "tail gate," and "blasting," may mean
much to a police officer writing a traffic citation, but it is unlikely
that they mean anything at all to a middle aged or female driver.
Yet the defendant is supposed to be informed of the nature of the
55
charge when the citation is issued on the street to him!

While police reluctance to use a standardized ticket was the
chief stumbling block to an earlier adoption of the uniform rules,
other effects of their adoption are likely to be much more far
reaching in altering administrative and procedural practices in
the various minor courts. The changes made may be grouped
under four heads: Those regulating official conduct of judges and
court officials; those emphasizing previously ignored statutory
criminal procedures; those imposing new procedures; and those
governing the conditions of ticket issuance and disposition.
Conduct of Judges and Officials
Most important of the rules regulating official conduct is
Rule .05, which makes the canons of judicial ethics applicable to
any judge, whether or not he is admitted to the bar. Combined
with this is Rule .04, which specifically imposes all the obligations
of a judge on any mayor who holds court. Even the most liberal
application of Canon No. 13 will compel many mayors to think
twice before sitting on cases in which their relatives, creditors,
and landlords are defendants or complaining witnesses, a circumstance which has not bothered some mayors in the past. Whether
the presence of the canons will give rise to a suspicion in many
mayors' minds that there may be a conflict of interest in serving,
simultaneously, as head of the law enforcement arm of his community and as arbiter between that arm and the private citizens
against which it files complaints is another question. 56 Many
mayors are rather insensitive to the bad public relations of the
first situation and completely oblivious to any ethical problems
raised by the second.
55 § 2935.17 Ohio Rev. Code.
56 Section 733.03 in cities and § 733.24 in villages makes the mayor of the
community the chief conservator of the peace. In cities he appoints the
safety director, who is responsible for the police department. § 737.01 Ohio
Rev. Code. In villages the appointment and control of the chief of police is
the mayor's responsibility. § 737.15 Revised Code.
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It is not to be expected that the mere imposition of the rules
will reform mayors' courts overnight so far as conflict of interest
problems are concerned. For there is no machinery other than
the appeal in individual cases to afford redress. No direct removal machinery is available, and the disbarment-quo warranto
technique used so successfully in the case of a municipal judge57
is obviously ineffective against a county judge or mayor who does
not have to be an attorney to hold his office. 58 It is true that the
remedy of contempt of the Supreme Court is possible, but the
limitations imposed by the Court on enforcement procedure by
contempt59 make it unlikely that contempt charges against judges
and mayors will be often invoked.
Of far more concern than the mayor's conduct in small communities is the rather widespread use in metropolitan communities of the plea of guilty and payment of fine by proxy. The
proxy system, used primarily by the business elements of the
community, consists of delivery of the recently received ticket or
citation to an agent with some standing or influence with a judge,
who then avoids appearance in open court but, instead, seeks out
the judge in chambers. In the absence of prosecutor or police the
agent enters a plea of guilty on behalf of his principal, has fine
or other disposition imposed, and all without troubling his principal with the bother of appearing in court. 60 In some communities the agent may be a bail bondsman, in others the defendant's
councilman, but in most cases the agent is an attorney who either
charges the principal a fee for legal services rendered or, more
57 Rather than attempt to remove a Youngstown judge directly, the Bar
Association first procured his disbarment for misconduct as a lawyer, committed while a judge. Mahoning County Bar Ass'n. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St.
17, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958), cert. den. 358 U.S. 932, 795 ch. 312 (1958). The attorney general of the state then brought quo warranto proceedings to compel
him to vacate the office on the ground that he must be a lawyer to hold his
judicial position under § 1901.06 Ohio Rev. Code (1965). State ex rel. Saxbe
v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 338, 154 N.E.2d 751 (1958).
58 While a county judge was required to be admitted to the practice of law,
commencing January 1, 1963, a grandfather clause permits non-lawyer
judges as of that date to continue to hold and run for the office. § 1907.051
Rev. Code.
59 Rule .06 provides: "... No proceeding in contempt under this rule may
be instituted except by leave of the Supreme Court of Ohio first obtained,
or on the application of the Review Commission hereinafter established."
60 It is, of course, the appearance of the defendant in court, and the time
spent there, apart from any lecture he receives, that constitutes the real
penalty to the affluent class. It is also a greater equalizer of penalty, since
a ten dollar fine may represent a real hardship to a marginal hourly worker
and none whatsoever to the executive.
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often, performs the function as a service accommodation for the
executives of his corporate clients. The practitioners of the art
of conviction by proxy see no imputation of ticket fixing in such
conduct. In fact the lawyers involved proclaim the practice as
constitutionally validated under "the right of the defendant to
appear by counsel," forgetting that the right is one to appear
"with counsel" and to appear in open court at that.
The rules of practice recommended by the Commissioners
of Uniform State Laws appear to handle the problem most directly by simply providing that the defendant must be present at
imposition of sentence in all traffic cases, except those which are
61
The new Ohio rules are somewhat
violations-bureau eligible.
more explicit, but also conspicuously leave a loophole. Rule .19
expressly forbids the receipt of a plea of guilty except by personal appearance in open court or actual disposition at violations
bureau, thus eliminating the chambers treatment of cases eligible
for, but not actually processed in, the violations bureau. But the
rule also creates an escape hatch by authorizing the court to
make other disposition upon separate application by the defendant in writing. 2 Whether many lawyers will take advantage of
such a device, and whether judges will care to spread on the
records of the court that treatment other than in open court was
had by a certain defendant remains to be seen. In addition there
is the problem common to all the new rules: How will they be
enforced? In any event the rule places in the hands of attorneys
a graceful way to bow out of the practice of "taking care of"
traffic tickets for regular clients, by pointing to the prohibitions
of the rule. Since many lawyers regard the business of disposing
of their client's traffic tickets as something less than the practice
of law and feel that they are forced into it by the huckstering
practices of bail bondsmen and others, possibly enforcement will
not be needed to secure compliance with the rule.
Aid in Applying Statutory Procedures
An area in which the new Ohio rules may be exceedingly
helpful is in directing attention of the minor court judges and
mayors to the existence of substantial recent changes in criminal
Rule 1:3-5 based on New Jersey Rule 8:10-7.
62 "No plea of guilty shall be received by the court other than by personal
appearance of the defendant in open court or disposition in accordance with
Rule .18 at a regularly established violations bureau, except with the consent of the court upon separate application in writing." Rule .19.
61
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procedure. Many of these new procedures have been ignored by
segments of the bar and judiciary for the eight years they have
now been in effect. The very fact that the rules themselves are
declared to be promulgated under authority of two sections of
the revised code passed as part of this same general revision may
be helpful in directing attention of the practicing bar to pocket
parts supplements to the criminal procedure act long overlooked.
The existence of a statutory, apart from a constitutional, obligation of the magistrate to inform a defendant of right to counsel
was apparently completely overlooked by counsel and the trial
court in Toledo v. Frazier63 and similar cases. Similarly the fact
that most special pleas in magistrate's court were abolished by
statute and that motion practice similar to that of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure6 4 was substituted seem to have been
generally overlooked. Attorneys are still filing and arguing, and
judges are still hearing and deciding demurrers to affidavits and
pleas in abatement, notwithstanding their statutory abolition, as
a number of reported cases bear witness. It is, perhaps, only disturbing to the purist to label what should be a motion to dismiss
as a demurrer or a plea in abatement, since the same purpose is
served by the one as by the other. But there has been a discernible tendency to prolong proceedings by offering, first motions,
then demurrers, then pleas in abatement, all at successive sessions of the court.
An additional reminder of statutory requirements is contained in Rule .18(f) relating to referees. Long continuance of
traffic cases, as well as other misdemeanor cases, for trial is not
calculated to engender respect for the court system. Yet sometimes these contested cases are long continued, notwithstanding
the provisions of § 2938.03 Ohio Rev. Code. This statute requires trial within thirty days and was passed for the express
purpose of eliminating long continuances for trial. The ostensible,
and frequently actual, reason for such illegal continuances is the
unavailability of traffic and criminal courtrooms and judges, the
tradition being that no matter how many judges there may be on
a multi-judge bench, all but two have to be occupied on the civil
side. Rule .18(f) suggests, without commanding, that the statute
means what it says and that, if necessary to comply with the
thirty-day rule, referees should be appointed to expedite trials.
10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967).
See § 2937.04 Ohio Rev. Code (1965) and Rule 12, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

63
64
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Recognizing both the mistake in nomenclature and the delay
problem, the Court, in Rule .11, declares that motions to form
(previously ignored in the Criminal Procedure Act) as well as
motions to substance, specified in § 2937.04 Ohio Rev. Code,
must be presented before plea.6 5 It then goes on to specify that
all motions "where possible" shall be made at the same time to
avoid delay. 66 It might have been helpful to provide, as does
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that the
filing of inconsistent motions does not constitute a waiver of any
67
one of them.
On the general subject of waiver the rules underline and
draw attention to another ignored provision of the Criminal
Procedure Act amendments of 1959. Section 2937.06 Ohio Rev.
Code provides that entry of plea to the charge shall constitute
a waiver of any objection which could be taken advantage of by
motion. Understandably such a rule is not applied strictly when
a defendant does not engage counsel until after his plea. But it
also has been ignored in cases in which counsel was retained and
simply did not bother to examine the charge until preparing for
trial. The result has been that frequently affidavits have been
frequently altered on the eve of or during trial to meet objections which were raisable earlier had counsel bothered to examine the charge before plea. The new rules, without adopting the
statutory provision, draw attention to it by the statement in Rule
.17(e) that entry of plea of not guilty by mail or by attorney,
shall constitute a waiver of all motions "as fully as would a plea
entered in person in open court."
The so-called "immediate trial" provisions of Rules 10 and
17(e) represent an attempt to clarify a murky area of Ohio's
statutory criminal procedure. The theory of right to immediate
trial had its genesis in former § 4549.17 Ohio Rev. Code, now
65 "In addition to those motions to an affidavit or complaint specified in
§ 2937.04 Ohio Rev. Code (1965), motions to form, such as to strike or to
require amendment of the affidavit or complaint, shall be offered, argued,
and ruled upon before plea." Rule .11. Compare Rule 12(b), Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which contemplates that all technical defenses shall
be raised by motion before trial but after plea.
66 "There shall be no required order for the offering of motions, and where
possible, all such motions shall be made at the same session of court or
stated in writing in a single document to the end that successive motions
will not be offered at successive appearances for the sake of delay." Rule
.19.
67 The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure similarly lack an express nonwaiver provision and are as express in their requirement of consolidation of
motions as are the Ohio ones. See Rule 12(b)2.
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repealed."" Under that section a traffic offender was entitled
to an immediate hearing upon arrest as a pre-condition to an
easier setting of bail by the arresting officer. Much later the
American Bar Association Traffic Court Program developed the
"officer's-day-in-court" device, an arrangement which operated at
cross purposes with the statute. 69 Under this device, the convenience of the officer, who might otherwise be compelled to be
in court on cases at various irregular times, was considered, and
the individual traffic defendants, instead of being rushed into
court for immediate trial, were cited to appear at a specific hour
of a specific day, on which all of that particular officer's cases
were heard by the court. Implicit in this arrangement was the
thought that if a defendant pleaded not guilty, he was to be tried
immediately, without advance information to (or case preparation by) the prosecutor. As a result both the arresting officer
and the defendant had to have their witnesses ready for trial and
in court, notwithstanding that the defendant might, by pleading
guilty, dispense with the need for witnesses. On the other hand,
if witnesses were not present and the defendant elected to go to
trial, the trial would have to be based on hearsay. Perceiving
these objectionable features-the unused witnesses, the waiting
by unarraigned defendants for trials to proceed, and the dangers
of trial by hearsay-the legislature, in its 1959 amendments to
the Criminal Procedure Act, eliminated both the right to immediate trial and trial on the Officer's Day in Court. It accomplished the former by repealing § 4549.17 Ohio Rev. Code, 70 and
the latter by inserting a provision in new § 2937.08, making trial
on the day of arraignment available only if both the prosecutor
and the defendant expressly consent.
Recognizing that in order to obtain a reasonably just trial it
was necessary to postpone the proceedings to a time after arraignment, and that requiring a defendant to appear twice in order to
68 128 Ohio Laws 97. Repeal was occasioned only partly by the fact that
this section was in conflict with new section 2937.08 Ohio Rev. Code, enacted
by the same act. It was an example of the then current practice of "hiding
away" criminal trial provisions in various unrelated titles and chapters of
the Code. §§ 4549.14 and 4549.16 pertaining to competency to testify remain
buried in Title 45 of the Code, and provision for bills of exception in criminal convictions before all magistrates, including municipal judges, is governed by § 1901.21 in a chapter of the Code relating to civil hearings before
county judges.
69 See J. Economos, Judge and Prosecutor in Traffic Court 54 (1951). The
idea is developed from G. Warren, Traffic Courts 40-41 (1942).
70 See n. 62, supra.
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get a fair trial operated to defeat such purpose, many municipal
courts had devised an arrangement whereby the defendant intending to plead not guilty could be excused from arraignment
and allowed to file his plea by mail. New rule .17(e) validates
this practice. Unfortunately both rule .17 (e) and rule .10 in their
71
language emphasize that immediate trial may be available, forgetting that immediate trial is a consensual arrangement, not
contingent merely on the availability of the court. Thus the two
rules may have the effect of encouraging courts to pressure defendants into having an immediate trial when this is in the court's
or officer's interest, but not necessarily in the defendant's interest.
New Procedures
There are remarkably few new procedures not contemplated
by the 1959 procedure act amendments. In view of the fact that
the 14th amendment exclusionary rules, including Mapp and
Beck and the right-to-counsel rules, including Gideon,72 Escobedo,7s and Miranda74 all were announced after the adoption of
Ohio's 1959 Criminal Procedure Act amendments, it might have
seemed logical to provide by rule that which the legislature had
conspicuously failed to provide by statute: appointment of counsel for the indigent at the magistrate court level and right of
counsel at the station house. But either wisely or unwisely, and
certainly conducive to their approval by a court not predisposed
to civil libertarianismJ 5 the new rules totally ignore the problems
of appointed counsel and the exclusionary rule.
This is not too surprising, considering that although the
provisions of § 2937.46 did not expressly limit the rules to traffic
misdemeanor procedures, those were stated to be their primary
purpose, and the draftsmen (judging from the title assigned to
the rules as proposed) considered themselves as so limited.
The extension of the Gideon and Miranda rules to traffic misdemeanors appears to be barred by the decision of the Supreme
Rule .17(e) recites "Except where arraignment and immediate trial are
available, the court . . . may provide. . . ." Rule .10: ". . . Immediate trial
following or contemporaneously with arraignment is permissible as provided
in Section 2937.08, Revised Code."
72 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792 (1963).
71

73 378 U.S. 478, 84 S. Ct. 1758 (1964).
74 384 U.S. 436, 85 S.Ct. 1602 (1966).
75

See n. 32-37, supra.
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Court in Toledo v. Dietz, 76 and by Court of Appeals decisions in

Columbus v. Hayes77 and Toledo v. Frazier;78 and the application
of the Griffin rule to traffic misdemeanors has at least been seriously questioned in State v. Stanton.79 Considering the current
of Ohio decisions, indulging in the civil libertarianism of extension of the exclusionary rules would likely have been an exercise
in drafting futility.
At the other end of the scale, efforts of traffic safety enthusiasts to reinsert provision for immediate trial at time of arraignment were checked, 0 although it remains to be seen whether or
not either police officers or defense counsel will impose on witnesses' time by requiring them to be present at arraignment, in
the hopes that their adversaries of the moment will accommodate them by consenting to trial and that the Court will actually
have time to hear the case then.
In one comparatively minor respect the rules do clarify and
implement a statutory provision which, in its original drafting,
was somewhat ambiguous. In dealing with mayors' courts and,
at the time of drafting, with county courts"" the procedure act
amendments recognized the twin evils of conducting jury trials
by non-lawyer mayors and county judges and of burdening the
grand jury and common pleas court by binding over minor traffic
misdemeanors.8 2 As a result the device of direct certification of
jury trial cases to "a court of record" of the mayor's or county
judge's selection was developed.8 3 Unfortunately the statute provided for only one method of bail, the old fashioned recognizance,
and it was not made clear that the transfer device was appro3 Ohio St. 2d 30, 209 N.E.2d 127 (1965).
9 Ohio App. 2d 38, 220 N.E.2d 829 (1964).
10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226 N.E.2d 777 (1967).
79 12 Ohio App. 2d 99 (1968). Both the Stanton case and City of Westerville v. Cunningham, 12 Ohio App. 2d 34 (1968), with which it is in conflict,
have been certified to the Supreme Court of Ohio for ultimate decision.
76
77
78

80 See n. 65, supra.
81 Until 1963 County Courts were considered

courts not of record. See
§ 1907.012 Ohio Rev. Code.
82 Prior to 1960 entry of plea of not guilty where imprisonment might be
part of the penalty required a county judge, in the absence of jury waiver,
to bind a misdemeanor defendant over to the grand jury. Former § 2937.10;
State v. Haycock, 103 Ohio App. 183, 144 N.E.2d 390 (1957); State v. Schaeffer, 66 Ohio Law Abs. 283, 116 N.E.2d 467 (1953). Draftsman's notes for the
amendments taking effect in 1960 described this as "running speeding and
right of way cases through the grand jury at great bother and little gain."
31 Ohio Bar 417, 433, May 12, 1958.
83 § 2937.08 Ohio Rev. Code (1965).
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priate only in jury eligible cases. A practice developed in some
areas of mayors electing to transfer all contested cases, whether
jury eligible or not, to the most convenient municipal court, carefully taxing all mayor's court costs and certifying them in the
transfer.
This practice of overindulgence of transfer may have had
real value in securing adequate hearing and consistent interpretation of legal principles in the case of particular defendants,
and perhaps any device which partially protects the public from
subjection to untrained administrators of justice should be applauded; but maintaining the device of transferring only contested cases would have had the effect of enabling mayors to perpetuate the institution of mayor's court. Requiring them, if they
maintain their courts at all, to apply technical rules of evidence
and to rule on trial motions impels them to consent to the abolition of the mayor's court as an institution. In addition, the overindulgence in certification was enabling municipal corporations
to profit from sums mulcted as costs which bore no real relation
to the costs of operation of their courts. The uniform rules8 4 not
only spell out, again, the limitation of the transfer device to jury
eligible cases, but specify the mechanics of the certification, including a listing of the documents to be forwarded, and indicate
in detail the actions to be taken by the receiving court when the
certification is made to it. Specific authority is granted to transmit to the receiving court any bail received, regardless of the
form in which it is acquired.8 5
Ticket Issuance and Disposition
Perhaps the most extensive changes made by the rules relate not to the form of the ticket, but to conduct in relation to it
by officers and court personnel. Much advance publicity for the
ticket has emphasized its "No Fix" nature, which is something
of a misnomer. There is basically no ticket which cannot be
"fixed," granted the determination to do so and the willingness
of a varying number of officials through whose hands it must flow
to accommodate themselves to the fix. The "No Fix" label
springs from two basic assumptions: first, that the court issues
all quadruplicate tickets with serial numbering to all police agenRule .20.
motions and docket entries together with bail, if any, shall be transmitted to the transferee court selected by the magistrate. . . ." Rule .20.
84

85 "....
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cies, and that the tickets must ultimately come back to the issuing court filled out as an affidavit; and second, that the courts
have both the means and the will to check back, ascertain what
tickets have been returned, and require accounting for those
which have not. In large metropolitan communities with a single
court the first of these assumptions could be basically correct, if
the courts themselves issue the tickets. In practice, however, any
authority courts may have had to impose issuance and audit controls on traffic tickets has long since been delegated to police departments, and the rules, as adopted, make it convenient for the
courts to continue to delegate such authority 86 In the less populous communities the individual courts not only deal with many
different enforcement agencies, but the same enforcement agency
may deal with many different courts.8 7 While the rules provide
in such situations for issuance to all agencies by a single one of
the courts,8 and for acceptability of that ticket in any court, 9
to maximize convenience in administration and police use, this
interchangeability of the ticket impairs the ability to follow up
on audit procedures.
The validity of the second basic assumption is also doubtful.
The tendency of courts in the past to delegate the issuance function (and with it the audit controls) to police departments augurs
ill for any great willingness of the courts to accept these responsibilities now. Issuance and accountability are likely to remain
in police departments in metropolitan communities, and to gravitate to them even in the smaller ones.
86 Rule .14: (c) Issuance. "The judge of each court exercising jurisdiction

in traffic cases, and in multiple-judge courts, the Chief Justice or Presiding
Judge thereof, subject to § 1901.15 Ohio Revised Code, shall designate the
issuing authority for traffic tickets, which may be the clerk of the court, the
violations referee, or the enforcement agency of the municipality ......
87 In county-wide municipal courts, city and village policemen from as
many as eight or ten communities may from time to time file traffic cases,
as may the sheriff's department, the Highway Patrol, and the Ohio Patrol,
Turnpike unit. Similarly the Sheriff's Department and the Highway patrol
unit in Hamilton, Summit, and Stark counties might each have from three
to ten different courts in which to file their charges, dependent entirely on
where the arrest was made.
8 "When a single enforcement agency (other than the State Highway
Patrol) regularly has cases in more than one court, the ticket used by such
agency shall be issued through, and be accountable to, the court for adults
in the most populous area in its jurisdiction issuing the Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket .. " Rule .14(c).
89 ".. . Any Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket properly issued to a peace officer
may be used and shall be accepted for filing and disposition in any court
inferior to the court of Common Pleas having jurisdiction over the offense
alleged ....." Rule .14(b).
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It seems probable that in those police departments where
accountability controls have been imposed in the past the new
ticket will make control more difficult and expensive. In many
departments the ticket was, in effect, a punched card base with
matching punched card retained at the issuing office. It became
a comparatively simple mechanical operation of sorting and
90
In
matching to account for the tickets as they were returned.
this particular aspect the punched card ticket was actually an
accountability device superior to the present quadruplicate paper
series, although other defects of the punched card (as a notice
to the violator and as a charging document) compelled its elimination. 91 Shifting to the "No Fix" ticket necessitates either a
hand-sorting operation or an additional key-punched series of
control cards, either of which will make the accountability function slower and more costly, whoever assumes the burden of its
operation.
For the individual traffic officer, use of the uniform, singlewriting, multiple-use ticket represents a clear gain in time. In
many communities he formerly wrote out, on the street, a form
of citation to the violator which varied from community to community in understandability to the recipient. At the end of his
shift-if he remembered to do so, he went to police headquarters,
to the court clerk's office, or both to type, sign, and swear to a
plain form affidavit and a varying number of departmental supplemental information forms. Some departments made the officer
do his own typing, not only on the affidavit, but on the police
records forms, thereby making him an unpaid clerk-typist for the
record room-a function not too efficiently discharged. Even in
those communities in which the punched card system was in
effect, the court affidavit had to be retyped in plain form if the
charge was contested, or even if it went to court, rather than to
the violations bureau. Apart from the opportunity to change the
nature of the charge between the time of the citation and that of
the court appearance, a wide opportunity for miscopying of name,
transposition of operator's license number, and the making of
90 The punch-card tickets issued to the various officers were actually partly
pre-punched, with the officer's badge number representing a series of
punches. Matching them against the master control card through a sorter
and noting return was no problem.
91 Unfortunately the key punches frequently obliterated vital wording on
the affidavit portion of the ticket; hence the punch card affidavit ticket was
of limited value to the court, and frequently misunderstood by the defendant.
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other copying errors existed, and court typing of disposition
records going ultimately to the bureau of motor vehicles afforded
occasion for additional copying errors. Under the new system,
not only can the defendant be reasonably assured that the charge
to which he answers will be the same one given to him on the
street by the officer, but the driver licensing authority will have
fewer errors in nomenclature and serial numbering to cope with,
and will be able to fix responsibility on the officer for those mistakes which do occur. In addition, the traffic judge can more
readily assume that the charge he is dealing with on the bench
is the same charge which was given the defendant before him by
the officer, and that the defendant has had ample opportunity to
study the same and obtain legal advice if he chooses.
At the judicial level administration will be drastically simplified. The mere filing, with the affidavit copy of the ticket, of
a partly completed report of conviction on the same size paper
will not only eliminate much needless copying of information by
the clerical staff, but eliminate one whole set of odd-sized papers
which must be stocked, sorted, and eventually filed. Added to
these comparatively minor and mechanical gains, however, is a
revision of thinking on what sorts of judicial tasks may properly
be delegated by traffic court judges.
As traffic accidents have increased and as police departments
have grown in size and efficiency, points of contact between police
agencies and offenders have grown at an enormous rate. Judicial
manpower, while increasing, has had to be devoted increasingly
to the civil side of an expanding docket 92 and has not been able
to keep pace with the increase of traffic citations filed. As a result, both in Ohio and elsewhere the use of the waiver, accompanied by tender of a fixed fine, has developed. This device
which, wisely or unwisely, avoids confrontation between traffic
defendant and traffic judge has, in most metropolitan communities, been institutionalized in the so-called Traffic Violations Bureau under supervision of the judges. Here pre-set fines with
written pleas of guilty are accepted and processed by the clerical
personnel of the court. Even the American Bar Association's
Traffic Court Program, which prefers the confrontation device,
is forced, somewhat reluctantly, to accept the violations bureau.
Some communities and courts have felt themselves forced to use
the device in an astonishingly large number of traffic violations
92

Whether it has had to be is debatable. That it has been is unquestioned.
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in which hazard is quite apparent, and even citations resulting
from traffic accidents 93 are there processed on a wide scale.
The problem facing the Supreme Court in attempting to cope
with excessive use of violations bureaus was two-fold: how to
assure that the really problem driver was brought into court
without completely inundating some traffic judges, and how to
avoid impelling the operator of a car involved in a traffic accident
to enter a plea of guilty before a clerk, which plea would subsequently become a stipulation of civil liability. The answer suggested by the rules is two-pronged. First: a drastic limitation is
imposed on those violations which may be processed through the
violations bureau, most notable of which are the accident-resulting violations, 9 4 transgressions of second offenders, 95 excessive
speeding, 96 and the "unusual circumstance" cases 97 in which the
police officer is given discretion to require court appearance.
Without more, such limitations would probably impose an
impossible load of three hundred or more cases per day on a
single traffic judge. 98 As relief the rules propose (by suggestion
and not by requirement) that the traffic judges, where they are
unable to obtain assignment of more judges to the traffic bench,
resort to a trained referee system, already considerably in vogue
in the juvenile courts. Professional qualification for the referees
is required; 99 a minimum daily number of cases in court is reThe incidence of violations bureau-processable and processed accidents
in Columbus Municipal Court was a matter of concern to the Ohio State
Automobile Association, and at one time during early drafts of the rules it
was provided that the violations referee could accept and pass upon no contest pleas.
94 Rule .18(b)2.
95 Rule .18(b)9.
96 Rule .18(b)8. Ironically, the rule is phrased in terms of "exceeding the
speed limit by more than fifteen miles per hour," a difficult definition to
square with Ohio's 'reasonable and proper' speed law as expressed in
§ 4511.21 Ohio Rev. Code (1965). See n. 42, supra.
97 Rule .18(b)10. The option given to the officer to make the decision of
whether or not the offender should be required to go to court instead of to
the violations bureau was much resisted, on the theory that this made the
police officer too much of a judge. It was noted that the officer always has
a much greater option: to cite or to overlook the violation in the first place.
98 Actually judges have handled greater volumes than this, by having the
offenders herded into a slowly-moving line with no opportunity to do more
than hear a one-word statement of the charge, plead guilty, and pay a
standardized fine. The superiority of such a system of justice to a violations
bureau is debatable.
99 Each referee must have the professional qualifications for a municipal
judge. Rule .18(f). Five years of active practice of law as a principal occupation is required. § 1901.06 Ohio Rev. Code (1965).
93
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quired as a prerequisite to their use; 10 0 and stability of personnel
is indicated. 01 Without expressly so stating, it is implied that the
no-contest plea in accident cases may be entertained and acted
upon by the referee. 10 2 In addition, the power of case-by-case
review and confirmation of sentence by the traffic judge is retained. 10 3 The major limitation on the use of referees is still, of
course, the willingness of the municipalities to provide funds and
hearing rooms to make the system effective. In addition, the use
of referees in the actual trial of contested cases is provided for
on a voluntary basis, subject to a demonstrated need as shown
by the volume of contested cases.
Whether the shift in emphasis from clerical help to legally
trained referees will be effective in solving the problems caused
by having too many serious offenses for available judicial manpower depends on whether local judges are sufficiently alert to
recognize the virtues of the system, sufficiently broadminded to
delegate some of their power and responsibility, and sufficiently
forceful to convince municipal and county appropriating authorities that the problem justifies the additional expenditure required. The fact that the Ohio legislature is conscious enough of
the referee technique to authorize and recommend its use in
minor civil cases 10 4 should, however, help to sell this feature of
the rules to the judges and their fiscal controllers.
Conclusion
Whether the new rules, including mandated use of the uniform traffic ticket, make any real impact on the Ohio traffic courts
and police agencies will be largely dependent on whether effective use is made of an institution which the Ohio Court has pio100 Seventy-five persons appearing for pleas per judge per day. Rule .18(f).

This figure was admittedly plucked from the air as permitting an average of
twelve minutes per case during a six-hour bench day. Many guilty plea
dispositions take less than half that time, even in uncrowded rural courts.
101 There is no precise standard set. Provision for "reasonably long term
appointments" is required. Rule .18(f).
102 Two types of referees are indicated by the rules: A violations referee,
so-called because of the use of the term in § 2937.46, who is really a clerk
and may be any suitable person. Rule .18 (a). As such, he is limited to receiving guilty pleas. The referee described in Rule .18(f) is really an adjudication referee, who receives pleas generally and may recommend findings and sentencing for confirmation by the judge.
103 Rule .18(f).
104 A small-claims referee is provided for by Chapter 1925 Ohio Rev. Code
(1965), which creates a small-claims division in each municipal and county
court. 133 Ohio Laws H 475, effective November 21, 1967.
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neered in devising. This is the Review Commission, which the
rules provide for' 0 5 and whose personnel has already been selected and announced. 10 6 Undoubtedly, even with seven years of
gestation and refinement there are "bugs" in the institution, some
of them (such as accountability 10 7) foreseen, and others unanticipated. It seems likely that there will be recalcitrant or unperceptive judges among those charged with applying the rules.
To make them work some salesmanship will be needed and possibly some evidence of will to resort to the ultimate remedy of
contempt to compel application. In addition, some willingness to
make interpretation and to stretch the letter of the rules to apply
their spirit, as well as readiness to receive complaints and suggestions for change of unworkable provisions, is needed. In this
respect the new Commission has a heavier burden than might be
expected, since the Supreme Court chose not to retain the bulk
of the group of draftsmen who had lived with and debated the
various drafts of the rules as ultimately adopted. Instead entirely new personnel, except for the chairman, were selected.
Whether the virtue of acquiring a fresh point of view on the
Review Commission outweighs the loss of experience remains
to be seen.
105
106

Rule .22.
40 Ohio Bar 1502 (December 18, 1967).

107 See Ticket Issuance and Disposition, pp. 19-21, supra.
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